Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

The State of Utah v. Daniel K. Riggs : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Laura B. Dupaix; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Robert K. Heinman; Lisa J. Remal; Ralph W. Dellapiana; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association;
Attorneys for Appellant.
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481) LISA J. REMAL (2722) RALPH W. DELLAPIANA (6861)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 424 East 500 South, Suite 300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM ATTORNEY GENERAL Heber Wells Building 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor P.O.
Box 140854 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 Attorneys for Appellee
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Riggs, No. 970012 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/614

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

COPY

UTAH COV^.T <1F APPEALS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaint if £/Appe 11 e e,

50
•A10

a-

v.

Case N o . .970012 -CA
Priority N o . 2

DANIEL K. RIGGS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appea] ^--" = ^udgment and conviction for three counts of
automo-Dixe norn..-. " , - *-.,.; uegree i.e •*•.:<-;
Ann.

; 76-5-207

(if- -r , and receiving

i .-= > -

or transferring

:'

-e

a .stolen

vehicle,, a 2nd dearee felony, in violation of Utah Code A n n , § 4 1 1 a -131 b

\±jt)>'

'

. •-• u J .1 :. :. .i., .J I S L M C ;

.._.;.

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Division I, the Honorable Anne M.
Stirba , > *

r-vesMina.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (54 81)
LISA J. REMAL (2722)
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA (6861)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. B o x 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Appellee

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JAN 2 6 1999
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

..or

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

DANIEL K. RIGGS,

: Case No. 970012-CA
Priority No. 2
:

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for three counts of
automobile homicide, a 2nd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann.

§ 76-5-207

(1995), and receiving or transferring a stolen

vehicle, a 2nd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41la-1316

(1998), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Division I, the Honorable Anne M.
Stirba, Judge, presiding.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481)
LISA J. REMAL (2722)
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA (6861)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT

OF

THE

ISSUES

AND

STANDARDS

OF

REVIEW,

AND

PRESERVATION BELOW

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

4
9

ARGUMENT

9

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE FLIGHT
INSTRUCTION.
A.
B.

ANALYSIS
CASELAW

UNDER

UTAH

FLIGHT

INSTRUCTION
10

FEDERAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS

13

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS
THE UN-MIRANDIZED STATEMENTS MADE BY MR. RIGGS TO
DEPUTY STRATFORD.
A.
B.
C.

9

15

THE STATE HAS CONCEDED THAT MR. RIGGS WAS IN
CUSTODY

16

DEPUTY
STRATFORD
INTERROGATED
MR.
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS

16

RIGGS

STATEMENTS MADE TO DEPUTY STRATFORD WERE THE
RESULT OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM A -- JUDGMENT, SENTENCE (COMMITMENT), R. 912-5
ADDENDUM B -- FLIGHT INSTRUCTION, R. 768
ADDENDUM C -- FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, R. 460-507

17
24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
page
Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468 (Utah App. 1993)
Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)
Chapman v. California. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,
17 L.Ed.2d 705 reh'g denied. 386 U.S. 987, 87
S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967)
Collazo v. Estelle. 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert, denied. 502 U.S. 1031, 112 S.Ct. 870, 116
L.Ed.2d 776 (1992)

2
20-22, 24

15

20, 21, 24

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880,
68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)

23

Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965,
85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)

14

Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
Pope v. Zenon. 69 F.3d 1018 (Or. 1995)
Rhode Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct.
1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)
Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996)

7, 15-17,
20, 21, 23
22-24
16, 22
2

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450,
61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)

14

State v. Allen. 839 P.2d 291 (Utah 1992)

21

State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983)

10, 11

State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995)
State v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991)
State v. Dunklev. 39 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1935),
overruled on other grounds in State v. Crank.
142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943)
ii

18
3

19

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987)
State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 1988)

15
. .

9, 11, 12

State v. Lindaren. 910 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1996)

24

State v. McGrath, 928 P.2d 1033 (Utah App. 1996)

21

State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996)

3

State v. Pacheco, 495 P.2d 808 (Utah 1972)

12

State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989)

3

State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986)

15

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)

22

State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996), aff'd
without opinion, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997)
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99
S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979)
United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1987), cert, denied. 485 U.S. 922, 108 S.Ct. 1093,
99 L.Ed.2d 255 (1988)

20

Woncr Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct.
407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)

20

3
14

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1

1

Utah Const. a r t . I , § 7

2

Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (i)

24

Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996)

iii

1
1, 13, 14
1

page
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)

iv

20

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v,
DANIEL K. RIGGS,

Case No. 970012-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

The

fourteenth

amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship —
protection.]

Due process of law -- Equal

All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in giving instruction

number 23, which allowed the jury to infer consciousness of guilt
of automobile homicide from the fact that Mr. Riggs was fleeing
prior to the fatal accident?
Standard of review.
We review the trial court's instructions to the
jury for correctness, affording no deference. Ames v.
Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993).
When
conducting this analysis, we review the instructions in
their entirety to determine whether the instructions,
when considered as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on
the applicable law.
Id.
"We reverse a trial court's
decision on the basis of an instruction improperly
submitted to the jury only where the party challenging
the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice
stemming from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.'"
Id. (quoting State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah
App.1991), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah
1993)) .
Salt Lake Citv v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah App. 1996) .

2

Preserved

below

at

R.

2166-8

supplementation), see also R. 2158-61

(order

re:

record

(affidavit in support of

supplementation).1

2.

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

refusing

to

suppress Mr. Riggs1 un-Mirandized statement?
Standard of Review.
"The factual findings of a trial court that
underlie its decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous." State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App.
1991); accord State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah
App. 1989).
The trial court's "legal conclusions are
reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion
given to the trial judge's application of the legal
standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,
1247 (Utah App.) , cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) .
State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah App. 1996).
Preserved below at R. 42-44

(motion), 79-100

(state's

memorandum in opposition), 101-10 (Mr. Riggs' reply memorandum),
982-1194

(evidentiary hearing transcript), 1195-1267

(argument,

esp. at 1223-8), 1321-54 (hearing re: findings and conclusions),
460-507 (findings and conclusions, attached as addendum C ) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant Daniel K. Riggs was charged by

information

dated November 22, 1995 with three counts of automobile homicide
and one count of receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle.
10 (information).

R. 6-

Mr. Riggs moved that the stolen vehicle count be

inadvertently, the objection made in the trial court was not
placed on the record.
This Court granted appellant's motion to
supplement the record, and the trial court found that the objection
in fact had been made at trial and overruled.

severed from the automobile homicide counts.
court granted the motion.

R. 311-7.

The trial

R. 396-7.

Mr. Riggs moved that various un-Mirandized statements be
suppressed.

R. 42-44.

The trial court entered detailed findings

and conclusions, granting the motion in part and denying the motion
in part.

R. 460-507 (addendum C) , esp. at 502 (statements made to

Trooper Bairett at scene of accident suppressed), 505-6 (statements
to Deputies Hunter, Stratford, and Roesler not suppressed).2
Mr. Riggs was tried by jury November 12-15, 1996 on the
automobile

homicide

charges.

See

transcripts,

R.

1407-1699

(11/12/96), 1700-1955 (11/13/96), 1956-2020 (11/14/96), 2021-2093
(11/15/96) .
counts.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three

R. 2083-4, 807, 812, 817.
On November 19, 1996, Mr. Riggs pled conditionally guilty

to receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, reserving the right
to appeal pretrial issues and errors at the automobile homicide
trial.

R. 859-60 (minute entry), 862-70 (statement of defendant).

Mr. Riggs was sentenced to four consecutive prison terms of 1 to 15
years, with restitution of $12,278.33.

R. 912-5.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Riggs' charges stemmed from events occurring in the
early morning hours of November 14, 1995.

The information alleged

that Mr. Riggs was driving a stolen 1992 Pord Ranger pickup truck

2

The statement to Deputy Roesler is not at issue in this
appeal.
4

with license plates

for a Geo Tracker.

When Trooper Bairett

attempted to make a traffic stop, the pickup attempted to evade.
The truck ran a red light at 65-80 M.P.H., striking a 1992 Saturn.
Both passengers in the Saturn as well as one passenger in the
pickup died as a result of injuries sustained.
alcohol content was

Mr. Riggs' blood

.13 percent as determined by a blood draw

obtained within an hour and fifteen minutes of the accident.

R. 6-

10 (information).
Shortly before 6:00 P.M. on November 14, 1996, Deputy
Stratford went to the hospital to see Mr. Riggs concerning some
threats made by family members of the victims.

R. 1123-4, 1126.

Deputy Stratford decided that while he was there, he would also try
to get Mr. Riggs1 side of the story concerning the incident.
1124,

1132-3.

No Miranda warning was given.

R.

R. 1124, 1135.

Deputy Brad Hunter was also there at that time. R. 1124-5.

Deputy

Hunter testified that he was there with Deputy Stratford for "maybe
five minutes."

R. 1157.

Deputy Stratford testified that all of

Mr. Riggs1 statements were made within three or four minutes.
1135.

R.

Deputy Stratford asked Mr. Riggs something akin to, "Do you

remember the accident?"
question.

R. 1133.

R. 1133.

Mr. Riggs responded to the

Deputy Stratford could not recall whether he

asked follow-up questions.

R. 1133-4.

During the time that Deputy Stratford was there, Mr.
Riggs made the following statements:
He volunteered that he knew the car was stolen
before the officer had turned his lights on and they
decided to run from him. About that time the news had
come on -- the television in his room was on and there
5

was a story about the accident. Mr. Riggs also made a
spontaneous statement that he did not know the gun was
loaded and that Kevin b[r3] ought it. He also said that
he was just taking them home and knew nothing about the
burglary earlier.
R. 1125.
Deputy Stratford said that at the time, he was not sure
if Mr. Riggs was free to leave.

R. 1127. He testified that he was

not arrested until an hour or hour and a half later.
116 0.

R. 1159,

When Mr. Riggs was taken to jail, he was booked in on

warrants.

R. 1129-30, Def. Exh. 6 (booking sheet).

Mr. Riggs was

still receiving medication on the 16th of November, slept during
the day, and appeared to be groggy from medication at that time.
R. 1143-4.
Based on the evidence, the trial court made the following
findings and conclusions:
101. Based on his briefing with Trooper Bairett,
Sergeant Craig and other law enforcement officers, Deputy
Stratford was aware of considerable evidence regarding
the likely cause of the collision and the possible use of
alcoholic beverages by the defendant.
102.
Deputy Stratford observed beer cans in the
collision debris.
103.
Deputy Stratford observed open beer cans
within the cab of the pickup.
104. Although not "100 percent" certain, after his
briefing with the law enforcement officers, Deputy
Stratford had a "strong idea" that the defendant was the
driver of the pickup.
208. Following some initial treatment and the blood
draw on November 14, 1995, the defendant was transferred
from Pioneer Valley Hospital to the University Medical
Center ("UUMC").

3

Although the suppression hearing transcript says "bought,"
this is a mistranscription. Deputy Stratford's police report and
his preliminary hearing testimony both say "brought." In context,
only brought makes sense.
6

209. Fairly soon after the defendant's admission to
the UUMC on November 14, 1995, a UUMC representative
contacted Deputy Stratford to tell him that the hospital
had received threats against the defendant's life and
that the hospital was concerned the defendant's family
might remove him from the hospital against the hospital's
wishes.
210.
In response, the defendant was provided
protection by security guards, including deputies from
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, until he was
released from the UUMC.
211. The guards were stationed in the defendant's
room also to ensure that the defendant did not leave the
hospital.
228.
Before Deputy Hunter left, he and Deputy
Stratford were together in the defendant's room for
approximately five minutes.
229. Deputy Hunter knew Deputy Stratford came to
the defendant's room to "complete the investigation."
232. Shortly before 6:00 P.M. on November 14, 1995,
Deputy Stratford arrived at the defendant's room at the
UUMC.
233. Deputy Stratford went to the UUMC initially
"to find out the problem with the threats" and then
decided "that while [he] was there [he] would try and
obtain [the defendant's] side of the story to find out
[the defendant's] version of what happened."
[brackets
in original]
234. Deputy Stratford did not advise the defendant
of his rights per Miranda while he was present in the
defendant's hospital room.
235. Deputy Hunter was present in the defendant's
room when Deputy Stratford arrived.
236. Deputy Stratford was in uniform when he came
to the defendant's room.
237. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the defendant
was talking to Deputy Hunter.
238. Deputy Stratford asked the defendant "if he
remembered the accident so that [Deputy Stratford] could
find out [the defendant's] side of the story." [brackets
in original]
239.
When Deputy Stratford arrived, the room's
television was on.
After Deputy Stratford asked the
defendant if he remembered the accident, a television
news story came on about the accident.
240.
Distracted by the news story, Deputies
Stratford and Hunter turned to listen to it.
241. At that time, according to Deputy Stratford,
the defendant spontaneously stated that "he knew the car
was stolen before the officer turned his lights on and
7

they decided to run from him;" "the gun was loaded and
that Kevin b [r]ought it;" and that "he was just taking
them home and knew nothing about the burglary earlier."
242. The deputies themselves had turned to watch
the news report and were not talking to the defendant
when he made these statements.
243. Deputy Stratford neither coerced nor tricked
the defendant to make any statements.
244. Although Deputy Stratford had asked a question
about whether the defendant could remember the accident
so that Deputy Stratford could fill out his version of
events, the statement was not made in response to Deputy
Stratford's question.
245. Indeed, the question [sic] was not actually
responsive to the question asked.
246.
Some of Deputy Stratford's
testimony
conflicted with some of his other testimony; however, he
was, nevertheless, a credible witness.
267. At the time the defendant allegedly made his
incriminating statements to the officers, his medical
condition did not appear to render him unable to make the
statements to the officers knowingly and voluntarily.
268. To the contrary, according to the officers, at
each time the defendant volunteered one of these
statements, the defendant had been engaged in casual
conversations.
269. Deputies Hunter, Stratford or Roesler neither
tricked
nor
coerced
the
Defendant
into
making
incriminating statements.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
17. The defendant was in custody at all times while
he was at the UUMC.
19.
The law enforcement officers knew that the
defendant was to remain in the hospital and that he was
not going to leave the hospital. They were not obligated
to arrest the defendant prior to his actual arrest.
20. None of the conversations between the defendant
and Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler constituted
interrogations nor did the deputies employ coercion or
trickery to elicit incriminating statements from the
defendant.
21. All of the incriminating statements made by the
defendant to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler were
spontaneous and voluntary.
22.
At the times the defendant made his
incriminating statements to Deputies Hunter, Stratford
and Roesler, he made the statements knowingly and
voluntarily; his medical condition did not render him
incapable of making those statements knowingly and
voluntarily.
8

R. 477, 493, 496-8, 501, 505-6 (addendum C ) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in giving instruction 23 on flight.
Any flight in this case occurred prior to commission of the alleged
automobile

homicides.

Under

Howland,

the

instruction

was

prejudicial error.
The

flight

instruction

set

up

an

unconstitutional

permissive inference in violation of Mr. Riggs' due process rights.
The jury was permitted to infer guilt of automobile homicide from
flight which occurred prior to commission of the charged offense.
This error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The
Mirandized

trial

court

statements

interrogation.

erred

made

to

in

refusing

Deputy

to

suppress

Stratford!s

un-

custodial

Deputy Stratford testified the statements were in

response to his questioning.

Under the facts and controlling

caselaw, the statements were obtained either directly in response
to or through exploitation of custodial interrogation.

This court

should reverse, and permit Mr. Riggs to withdraw his conditional
guilty plea to receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
FLIGHT INSTRUCTION.4

4

IN GIVING

THE

This issue affects not only the automobile homicide
convictions at issue in the trial, but also the receiving or
transferring a stolen vehicle conviction under Mr. Riggs'
(continued...)
9

At trial on the automobile homicide charges, the trial
court gave the jury instruction 23, which provided:
The flight or attempted flight of a person
immediately after the commission of a crime or after that
person is accused of a crime that has been committed, is
not sufficient in itself to establish the defendant's
guilt.
However, such flight, if proved, may be
considered by you in light of all other proven facts in
the case in determining guilt or innocence.
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred
from flight, it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt
of the crime charged, and there may be reasons for flight
fully consistent with innocence. Therefore, whether or
not evidence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt and
the significance, if any, to be attached to any such
evidence are matters exclusively within the province of
the jury.
R. 768 (addendum B ) .
Defense counsel objected, arguing that as a matter of
logic Mr. Riggs could not have a consciousness of guilt for a crime
that had not yet been committed.
2158-61

R. 2166-8
(affidavit

(order re: record

supplementation;

R.

in

support

of

supplementation).

The trial court overruled the objection on the

basis that the jury could properly infer that by fleeing, Mr. Riggs
had consciousness that he was intoxicated.
A.
Flight

R. 2159.

ANALYSIS UNDER UTAH FLIGHT
CASELAW.

INSTRUCTION

instructions have been improved

factually supported.

in Utah where

E.g. State v. Bales, 675 P. 2d 573

4

(Utah

(...continued)
conditional guilty plea. See R. 870 (actually the backside of R.
869) (preserving M4) all other motions and issues raised during the
defendant's trial on three counts of automobile homicide . . . ") .
10

1983) .5

However, to be factually supported the flight must occur

after the crime charged.

State v. Howland, 761 P. 2d 579 (Utah App.

1988) directly addresses this issue.
fist

fight,

then

combatant, Howland

fled.

After

attempted

Howland became involved in a

being

to draw

run

down

a knife.

by

the

The

other

jury

was

instructed on flight as follows:
Intentional flight by a defendant immediately
after the commission of a crime is not sufficient in
itself to establish guilt, but is a fact which, if
proved, may be considered by the jury in the light of all
other evidence in the case determining guilt or
innocence. Whether or not evidence of flight shows a
consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to
be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively
within the province of the jury.
Howland

761

P. 2d

at

580.

This

instruction

is

almost

indistinguishable from that here, substantively different only in
that

the

Howland

instruction

did

not

incorporate

the

Bales

admonitions set forth supra at 11 in footnote 5.6
5

Bales also required that any flight instruction also must
incorporate the concepts that (1) there may be reasons for flight
fully consistent with innocence, and (2) that even if consciousness
of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect
actual guilt of the crime charged. Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. The
instruction at issue here adequately incorporates both concepts.
6

In redlined form, the instruction here involved the following
changes to the Howland instruction:
Intentional flight by a defendant^^^^^^^^
commission of a crime ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ P
in itself to establish ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B guilt-—but ia a
fact whichf| ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ P / if proved, may be
considered by the j u r y ^ ^ infcfeelight of all other
evidencQJ^^^^^^^^^P in the case §|§ determining guilt
or innocence.
(continued...)
11

The Court found the instruction to be error:
We agree with appellant that it was error to
give any flight instruction in this case because no
flight occurred after commission of the crime charged."
"It seems almost axiomatic that instructions must bear a
relationship to evidence reflected in the record, and we
cannot enjoy the luxury of sustaining a conviction on
trite aphorism unsupported by any kind of evidence."
State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 281, 495 P.2d 808, 808
(1972).
State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah App. 1988).
Because of this confusing and unnecessary
instruction, the jury was likely misled into believing
that the incident at the dumpster area -- at most a
simple assault and a threat of future harm to persons
other than Elliston -- met the elements of the crime
charged, i.e., aggravated assault.
Howland, 761 P.2d at 581.
So here, giving the instruction was reversible error. At
trial on the automobile homicide charges, the flight instruction
was not factually supported and should not have been given.

Mr.

Riggs was not on trial for any crime committed prior to fleeing.
Rather, he was on trial for deaths that occurred in the accident
that occurred at the end of the flight.
of

automobile

homicide

No consciousness of guilt

may be inferred

from the prior act of

fleeing.

6

(...continued)

W,
or not evidence of flight shows a
consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to
be attached to any such evidence are matters
exclusively within the province of the jury.
12

The trial court overruled the objection on the basis that
the jury could properly

infer that by fleeing, Mr. Riggs had

consciousness that he was intoxicated.
was not so limited.

It referred to consciousness of guilt,

consciousness of intoxication.
is misplaced.

However, the instruction
not

Even an inference of intoxication

Under the specific facts of this case, involving a

stolen truck, presence of a loaded weapon, and an earlier burglary,
it is unlikely that the flight was the result of a consciousness of
intoxication,

rather

than

an

attempt

to

avoid

detection

and

prosecution on the other more serious offenses.
Absent

the

improper

flight

instruction,

reasonable probability of a better result.

there

is

a

In distinguishing

between 2nd degree and 3rd degree felony automobile homicide, the
jury was supposed to assess whether Mr. Riggs1 conduct was criminal
negligent versus whether it was only negligent.
76-5-207

(1995) .

Utah Code Ann. §

The improper flight instruction permitted an

inference of a knowing mental state.

It is entirely possible that,

as a result of the flight instruction, the jury inferred criminal
negligence was present because Mr. Riggs had a consciousness of
guilt of automobile homicide.

This Court should reverse.

B. FEDERAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS.
Additionally, the flight instruction violated Mr. Riggs1
right to due process.

It created a permissive inference from facts

which do not warrant that inference.

It allowed the jury to infer

a consciousness of guilt of automobile homicide from the mere act
of fleeing prior to commission of that offense.
13

The test for assessing permissive inferences is set forth
in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d
344 (1985):
A permissive inference does not relieve the State of its
burden of persuasion because it still requires the State
to convince the jury that the suggested conclusion should
be inferred based on the predicate facts proved. Such
inferences do not necessarily implicate the concerns of
Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61
L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)] . A permissive inference violates the
Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is
not one that reason and common sense justify in light of
the proven facts before the jury. Ulster County Court[v.
Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-2227,
60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979)].
Id. at 314-5, 105 S.Ct. at 1971.
The requisite mental states for 3rd degree and 2nd degree
automobile homicide are negligence and criminal negligence.
Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) and -(2) (1995).

Utah

The flight instruction

invited the jury to infer a knowing mental state ("consciousness of
guilt") from the act of fleeing.

Thus, the jury was relieved of

having to determine whether Mr. Riggs' conduct was
negligent, negligent, or non-negligent.

criminally

A knowing mental state

subsumes each of these lesser mental states.
Here,

reason

and

common

sense

do

not

justify

the

conclusion that the act of fleeing indicated that Mr. Riggs had a
consciousness of guilt of a crime that he had not yet committed.
Mr.

Riggs' due process

rights have been violated because

the

permissive inference suggests a conclusion that "is not one that
reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before
the jury."

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 315, 105 S. Ct. at

14

Because

this

error

is

of

constitutional

magnitude,

Mr. Riggs is entitled to reversal unless the State can show the
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Tarafa. 720

P.2d 1368, 1373 and n.21 (Utah 1986) (citing Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11, reh'g
denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967)); State
v. Hackford,

737 P.2d

200, 204-05

(Utah 1987)

(constitutional

harmless error standard rather than evidentiary abuse of discretion
standard is applicable where a constitutional right is impinged).
This error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In

distinguishing

between

2nd

degree

and

3rd

degree

felony

automobile homicide, the jury was supposed to assess whether Mr.
Riggs1 conduct was criminal negligent versus whether it was only
negligent.

The improper flight instruction permitted an inference

of a knowing mental state.
result

of

the

flight

It is entirely possible that, as a

instruction,

the

jury

inferred

criminal

negligence was present because Mr. Riggs had a consciousness of
guilt of automobile homicide.

This Court should reverse.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
SUPPRESS THE UN-MIRANDIZED STATEMENTS MADE BY
MR. RIGGS TO DEPUTY STRATFORD.7
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that before a person
could be subjected to custodial interrogation, he or she must be

7

This issue affects only Mr. Riggs' conditional guilty plea to
receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle.
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informed of the right to remain silent, that anything said can and
will be used against the individual in court, the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during interrogation,
and that if indigent a lawyer will be appointed.
S.Ct. at 1624-7.

Id. at 467-73, 86

Absent establishment of proof of such a warning

by the prosecution, statements are inadmissible at trial.

Id. at

479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.
A.

THE STATE HAS CONCEDED THAT MR. RIGGS WAS
IN CUSTODY.

As set forth in the statement of facts, while under guard
by sheriff deputies at the hospital Mr. Riggs made incriminating
statements to Deputy Stratford.
Riggs was in custody.

The State has conceded that Mr.

R. 1205:6-14

(oral argument).

In accord

with both the facts and that concession, the trial court concluded
that Mr. Riggs was in custody.
B.

Conclusion 17 (R. 505).

DEPUTY STRATFORD INTERROGATED MR. RIGGS
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS.

The Supreme Court defined "interrogation" in Rhode Island
v. Innis:
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come
into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to
either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response" from the suspect.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-1, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 168990, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
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Here, there is no question that Mr. Riggs was subjected
to express questioning.

Deputy Stratford testified that his intent

was to obtain Mr. Riggs' side of the story concerning the incident.
R. 1124, 1132-3.
he

could

He testified that he directly asked Mr. Riggs if

remember

the

accident.

R.

1133.

This

is

express

questioning.
Likewise, there is no question that Mr. Riggs was not
Mirandized.
1150,

R. 1124, 1135, 497 (Stratford did not Mirandize him);

1156, 494

(Hunter never Mirandized

him) ; 1017

(Trooper

Bairett never Mirandized him at the scene); 1046 (Deputy Roberts
never Mirandized him).
Thus, Mr. Riggs was subjected to custodial interrogation
without benefit of Miranda warnings.
C.
In

light

STATEMENTS MADE TO DEPUTY STRATFORD WERE
THE RESULT OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION.
of

all

the

facts

and

circumstances,

the

statements made to Deputy Stratford were the result of custodial
interrogation.

The trial court's purported factual findings and

legal conclusions to the contrary are against the great weight of
the evidence.
It is undisputed that Deputy Stratford questioned Mr.
Riggs prior to any statement.
three or four minutes.

R. 1135.

R. 113 5.

The total time frame was

Deputy Stratford's testimony

about the nature of Mr. Riggs1 statements is at best ambiguous.
agreed with the prosecutor's leading questions:
Q
A
Q

And did Mr. Riggs make a spontaneous statement?
Yes, he did.
Were you talking to Mr. Riggs at the time?
17

He

A
No. He was talking to Deputy Hunter.
Q
Were you interrogating Mr. Riggs at the time?
A
No, I didn't.
Q
What was the spontaneous statement that Mr.
Riggs made?
A
He volunteered that he knew the car was stolen
before the officer had turned his lights on and they
decided to run from him. About that time the news had
come on -- the television in his room was on and there
was a story about the accident. Mr. Riggs also made a
spontaneous statement that he did not know the gun was
loaded and that Kevin b [r] ought it. He also said that he
was just taking them home and knew nothing about the
burglary earlier.
R.

1125:6-21.

See also R.

1159

(responding

affirmatively

leading question about "spontaneous statements").

to

However, this

testimony was directly contradicted on cross-examination:
Q
And, in fact, you specifically asked him if he
remembered the accident in order to find out his side of
the story?
A
Yes, uh-huh.
Q
And that was stated to him in question form,
something like, ["]Do you remember the accident? ["]
A
Yes.
Q
And you asked him follow-up questions about
what he remembered about the accident. Correct?
A
I asked him if he remembered the accident so I
could find out his side of the story, yeah.
Q
And my next question is, he responded to that.
Correct?
A
Yes, uh-huh.
Q
And told you something of what he remembered?
A
Yes.
Q
And you asked follow-up questions to try and
get some more details from him, did you not?
A
I don't recall if [I] asked any other follow-up
questions or not. . . .
R. 1133:6-25.
The burden of establishing that Mr. Riggs' statements
were voluntary and spontaneous was on the State.

State v. Carter,

776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 1989) ("State bears the burden of proving
by at least a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's
18

confession is voluntary").

Here, the fully marshalled evidence

above shows that the State failed to meet that burden.
The trial court provided no persuasive reason why Deputy
Stratford's conflicting testimony should be resolved in favor of a
finding of spontaneity.

The questions asked by the prosecution

were leading and conclusory.

Naturally, a police officer will have

a tendency to try to help the prosecution and hinder the defense.
In light of these considerations, the concessions made on crossexamination have more indicia of reliability.

Absent a compelling

reason, the trial court was not at liberty to discount only that
testimony which favors Mr. Riggs:
Certainly the court could not properly have admitted in
evidence only the disserving statements by excluding the
self-serving, and, when both were admitted, the jury
could not be permitted to do what the court could not
have done, consider only the disserving and reject the
self-serving, or to believe the disserving and disbelieve
the self-serving, unless there is something either
intrinsic or extrinsic to render the self-serving
questionable or doubtful or inconsistent.
State v. Dunklev, 39 P.2d 1097, 1109

(Utah 1935), overruled on

other grounds in State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 188 (Utah 1943) .
Given Deputy Stratford's testimony that Mr. Riggs' remarks were in
response

to his

questioning,

the

statements

should

have

been

suppressed as the result of un-Mirandized custodial interrogation.
Even if there were a proper basis for ignoring Deputy
Stratford's testimony that the statements were in response to his
questioning,
statement

was

questioning.

the

State

still

sufficiently

failed

attenuated

to

show

from

that

the

prior

The total time frame was 3 or 4 minutes.
19

Mr. Riggs'
illegal

R. 1133.

The factors that are relevant to determining
the effect of previous police coercion have been spelled
out in United States v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188, 1192
(9th Cir. 1987) . They are whether (1) there was a break
in the stream of events sufficient to insulate the
statement from the effect of the prior coercion, (2) it
can be inferred that the coercive practices had a
continuing effect that touched the subsequent statement,
(3) the passage of time, a change in the location of the
interrogation, or a change in the identity of the
interrogators interrupted the effect of the coercion, and
(4) the conditions that would have precluded the use of
a first statement had been removed.
The application of these factors to the facts
of the case at hand is similar to the task mandated by
the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 3 71 U.S.
471 at 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407 at 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) .
We must determine "whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which ... objection
is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality
or
instead
by
means
sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
(quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)). Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 2254,
2261-62,
45
L.Ed.2d
416
(1975),
also
provides
considerable guidance:"
The question whether a confession is the product of
a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the
facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive.
The workings of the human mind are too complex, and
the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to
permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn
on ... a talismanic test. The Miranda warnings are
an important factor, to be sure, in determining
whether the confession is obtained by exploitation
of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only
factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of
the arrest and the confession, the presence of
intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct
are all relevant....
And the burden of showing
admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution,
(citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 421 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc),
cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1031, 112 S.Ct. 870, 116 L.Ed.2d 776 (1992) .
In determining the validity of a confession or
incriminating statements following police illegality, two
inquiries must be made."
First, the court must
determine "voluntariness," i.e., whether the confession
20

was voluntary;
second, the court must determine
"attenuation," i.e., whether the confession was obtained
in the course of police exploitation of the prior
illegality or, in other words, whether the voluntary
confession was sufficiently attenuated from the prior
police misconduct to remove any taint.[] The confession
must meet both tests to be admissible.
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992) (footnote cites to
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-4, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2260-2, 45
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), et al,

omitted).

Applying the Collazo factors here, Mr. Riggs' statements
were obtained by direct exploitation of the illegal questioning.
There was no break in the stream of events sufficient to insulate
the statement from the effect of the prior improper questioning.
The television newscast

about the accident only increased

pressure on Mr. Riggs to answer to Deputy Stratford.

the

Second, it

can easily be inferred that the coercive practices had a continuing
effect

that

touched

the

statement.

Indeed,

Deputy

testified that Mr. Riggs was responding to his question.

Stratford
R. 1133.

Third, there was minimal passage of time, no change in location,
and no change in identity of the interrogator.

Finally, Mr. Riggs'

un-Mirandized condition had not been removed.
Under the similar Brown factors, the result is identical.
First, no Miranda warnings were given.

Second, the statements

occurred almost immediately after the improper questioning.
total time frame was 3 to 4 minutes.

The

Compare State v. McGrath, 928

P. 2d 1033, 1038 (Utah App. 1996) ("The eight-month period elapsing
before Ricks testified was significant and favors attenuation in
the instant case.").
21

Third, the only possible intervening circumstance was the
television news report of Mr. Riggs' accident. Significantly, this
"intervening circumstance" only makes the situation worse.

The

newscast was such that, in light of the prior questioning, it would
further prompt Mr. Riggs to respond to the pending question.
Innis,

the

combined

circumstance

of

the

questioning

Under

followed

immediately by the newscast are circumstances

"that the police

should

an

know

are

reasonably

response" from the suspect."
1689-90.

likely

to elicit

incriminating

Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at

The newscast acted as continued interrogation.
Finally,

the

conduct

was

flagrant

obtaining statements from Mr. Riggs.

and

directed

Deputy Stratford testified

that his purpose was to obtain information from Mr. Riggs.
Stratford's conduct was purposeful and direct.
anything

but

statements

inadvertent.

were

obtained

Under
as

a

at

all

direct

the

The result was

Brown

result

Deputy

of

factors,
the

the

improper

questioning:
Where the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean
break in the chain of events between the misconduct and
the consent to find the consent valid.
For example,
Justice Powell in Brown suggested that, where it appears
from the facts that the police purposely engaged in the
conduct
to
induce
a
confession,
an
intervening
consultation with counsel or presentation before a
magistrate may be required before the taint can be
removed. 422 U.S. at 611, 95 S.Ct. at 2265-66 (Powell,
J., concurring).
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1264

(Utah 1993).

Mr. Riggs'

statements should have been suppressed.
Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018 (Or. 1995) is illustrative.
Officers

interrogated

Pope prior to Mirandizing him.
22

He made

incriminating remarks.
question

concerning

After being read his rights, he asked a

the

right

to

counsel,

directly into making incriminating remarks.

and

then

launched

6 9 F.3d at 1020-22.

The court rejected any contention that, under these facts, the
confession was spontaneous and voluntary:
[T]o argue that Mr. Pope just blurted out a confession
after being advised of his rights simply distorts the
facts. As demonstrated by the quoted record, we have no
difficulty
concluding
that
Mr.
Pope's
so-called
"spontaneous statements" were directly induced by
Detectives
McDonald's
and
Perry's
prohibited
interrogation tactics. Any alleged state court finding
of fact to the contrary is clearly erroneous, and any
conclusion of law that Mr. Pope's confession was not the
product of interrogation, but "volunteered" as defined in
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, and Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68
L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), is equally wrong.
Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d at 1024.
Mr. Riggs' statements were made in response to improper
un-Mirandized custodial interrogation.

The trial court's findings

and conclusions to the contrary should be reversed.

Specifically,

finding 244, that "the statement was not made in response to Deputy
Stratford's question," R. 498, is directly contradicted by Deputy
Stratford's testimony to the contrary, R. 1133.

Finding 245, that

the statement "was not actually responsive to the question asked,"
R. 4 98, is not well taken. Asked what he recalled of the accident,
Mr. Riggs responded with details surrounding the accident.
responsive.

It was

Conclusion 20, that "None of the conversations . . .

constituted interrogations," R. 505-6, is incorrect.

Both the

direct

newscast

questioning

constituted

about

interrogation.

the

accident

Finally,
23

and

the

conclusion

TV
21,

that

the

statements were spontaneous and voluntary, R. 506, is contrary to
Collazo, Brown, Pope, and Deputy Stratford's testimony at R. 1133.
The trial court should be reversed.
D.

NO PREJUDICE NEED BE SHOWN BECAUSE THIS
ISSUE IS RAISED PURSUANT TO A CONDITIONAL
GUILTY PLEA.

This suppression issue, concerning Mr. Riggs' statements
about the stolen truck, is raised pursuant to a conditional guilty
plea.

The stolen truck charge has never gone to trial. No harmful

error analysis is possible.

State v. Lindqren, 910 P. 2d 1268, 1274

(Utah App. 1996) (in conditional plea context, appellate court must
presume

prejudice).

Cf. Rule

11 (i),

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure (remedy for error is withdrawal of plea).

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Riggs respectfully requests
that

his

convictions

be

reversed.

The

automobile

homicide

convictions should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings
due to the improper flight instruction, and Mr. Riggs should be
permitted

to withdraw

his

conditional

plea

of

guilty

receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle charge.

to

the

The trial

court's order denying suppression of statements made to Deputy
Stratford should be reversed, and Mr. Riggs should be permitted to
withdraw his conditional guilty plea to receiving or transferring
a stolen vehicle.
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ADDENDUM A
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE (COMMITMENT), R. 912-5

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

mM^*^^fT

^

Plaintiff.
vs.

JRi 3 % ^

n

uc

r\/\.\f*

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
Case No.
Count No.

'

Hnnnrahlp

A l A r v - /SA. <=4< rkx^

-

j

Clerk
r V ~T~UprKv^
Reporter £ . \S['A^or\
Bailiff
tj
lv/i^

Defendant.

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by (jta jury: D the court; • plea of guilty;
D plea of ng contest; of the offense of A u ^ r V ^ O ^ i l e H p m l C J < ^ &
a felony
of the - ^ i * s r d e g r e e ^ a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by L k-W/vv^
, and the State being represented by 1£« L ^ f l r t a r*>*3s now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
D
IX
D
D
D
%

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
; ^
i
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ | ^ j A T f c T o N t t c r n n n ^

D
JX
D
D
•

such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with n\^X
CVC>IA.KVH>
upon motion of D State, Q Defense, D Court, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
JS( Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County-S*for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant
~~~
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
JS Commitment shall issue
DATED this —*

day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT J U t j £ E > * ~
"**"£L

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

h.c,n fc.v

(White—Court)

(Green—Judge)

Page
(Yellow—Jail/Prison/AP&P)

(Pink—Oefense)

(Goldenrod—State)

tf'irosi?

4_0,-i

IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

Case No.
Count No. -sss*
Honorable
A A A ^

vs.

£ <%S

U2A&.

L )(\\r\\ &\ kC.

Clerk

/SA,

<jfry\^^

\A- *TV\r?rr\r,

Reporter £ ,
Bailiff
£^

\l^\\f?c?f\
\u\e

Defendant.

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by £f'aa jury; •C the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of fci4orv\ob;U Y^yt
a felony
yiu\
of the ^ ^degree,^ a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented Iby *-* K C r v v a l • and the State being represented by V~> ( ^ p ^ - y y p ^ j g now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
D
tf
D
D
D
J$

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
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ADDENDUM B
FLIGHT INSTRUCTION, R. 768

INSTRUCTION NO.

^°>

The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after
the commission of a crime or after that person is accused of a
crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to
establish

the

defendant's

guilt.

However,

such

flight, if

proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proven
facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence.
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight,
it

does

not

necessarily

reflect

actual

guilt

of

the

crime

charged, and there may be reasons for flight fully consistent
with innocence.

Therefore, whether or not evidence of flight

shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to
be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within
the province of the jury.
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ADDENDUM C
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, R. 460-507

inn omnia QQmi

r

Hi>H inrtWai District

JUN 28/1996
^

Oeoutv Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:

-vs-

:

DANIEL K. RIGGS,

: JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

Defendant.

CASE NO. 961900273

:

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
two motions of defendant, Daniel K. Riggs: (1) ''Motion to Suppress
Blood Draw Evidence" and

(2) "Motion to Suppress Defendant's

Statements".
On April 26, 1996, an evidentiary hearing on the two motions
was held before the Court at which time the defendant was present
and represented by counsel Lisa J. Remal and Susanne Gustin-Furgis,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.

The State of Utah was

represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy District Attorney.

At

the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Court ordered
additional briefing and scheduled oral argument by the parties on
May 10, 1996.

0 0046 0

STATE V. RIGGS

PAGE TWO

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

At the May 10 oral argument, the defendant was again present
and represented by Ms. Remal and Ms. Gustin-Furgis.

Additionally,

Ralph Dellapiana, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, also argued
in

behalf

of

the

defendant.

represented by Mr. Updegrove.

The

State

of

Utah

was

again

At the conclusion of the oral

argument, the Court ruled from the bench on all issues and ordered
Mr. Updegrove to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law.1

thereafter, defendant's counsel received the proposedfindingsof fact and conclusions of law
and submitted written objections to them. At a hearing on June 4, 1996, attended by the defendant
and counsel for both parties, the Court ruled on the objections and proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. A second draft of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law was then
prepared. The Court has now carefully reviewed the second draft, re-read the transcript of the
suppression hearing, made numerous changes to the second draft and hereby renders these findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
Because of limitations of time and resources, the Court has not specified the various citations
to the suppression hearing transcript to which thefindingscorrespond. Indeed, evidence regarding
certain events such as, for example, the probable cause evidence known by a particular officer at a
particular time, may be addressed at several different places throughout the transcript according to
what the officer himself said and also to what other officers said they told to the officer.
Further, specific findings may vary somewhat from the exact language used by a witness at
one location in the transcript. Where this occurs, the variation results from the Court's review of all
of the evidence concerning the subject matter addressed, the weight of the evidence, the inferences
that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, if appropriate, and the reasonable reconciliation of
conflicts in the evidence, if appropriate. Thus, consideration of all of the evidence has been given in
rendering these findings of fact.
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FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS
A.

Blood Draw Test Results

Turning first to the defendant's claims regarding the blood
draw evidence, he seeks to suppress two different blood alcohol
test results of blood drawn from him: (1) the "state-analyzed"
blood drawn by the State's phlebotomist, Bryan Davis ("Mr. Davis"),
and analyzed by the State's toxicologist, Bruce Beck ("Mr. Beck");
and (2) the "hospital-analyzed" blood drawn by Mr. Davis at the
request of Pioneer Hospital and analyzed by the Pioneer Valley
Hospital Laboratory.
As to the state-analyzed blood, the defendant claims the blood
alcohol results of the defendant's blood samples are inadmissible
because (1) the defendant was not under arrest and did not give his
consent to his blood being drawn, the blood draw constitutes an
unconstitutional search under both the United States Constitution
and the Constitution of the State of Utah; (2) the chain of custody
of the state-analyzed blood was defective; (3) the manner in which
the state-analyzed blood was stored by Mr. Davis and stored and
tested by Mr. Beck; and (4) only the law enforcement officer who
was present at the hospital with the defendant could have ordered

Hv4so2

STATE V. RIGGS

PAGE FOUR

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

the defendant's blood to be drawn, and he did not have probable
cause to do so.2
As to the hospital-analyzed blood, the defendant claims the
blood alcohol results are inadmissible because (1) the blood draw
constitutes
constitute

an

unconstitutional

privileged

information

search;

and

under

the

(2)

the

results

physician-patient

provisions of Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
B.

Defendant's Alleged Statements

Defendant has also moved to suppress incriminating statements
he allegedly made to different law enforcement officers on several
different occasions on the grounds that (1) these statements were
taken

in

violation

of

his

rights

under

the

United

States

Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah; and (2)
because of the injuries he received in the automobile collision and
resulting medical treatment, any such statements made by him were
made neither knowingly nor voluntarily.
C.

Burden of Proof

It is undisputed that the State of Utah has the burden of
proof in this proceedings.

2

The Court has by its Memorandum Decision dated May 17, 1996, resolved this issue.
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FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

The Court, having considered the weight of the oral and
documentary

evidence, the

credibility

of

the witnesses, the

inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the
written and oral arguments of all counsel, and because good cause
has been shown, hereby enters the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Criminal

Defendant

is charged by

Homicide,

Automobile

Information

Homicide;

with

Count

II,

Count

I,

Criminal

Homicide, Automobile

Homicide; Count

III, Criminal Homicide,

Automobile Homicide;

and Count IV, Receiving or Transferring a

Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer, or Semitrailer.
2.

The

Information

is

based

upon

defendant's

alleged

criminal activity on November 14, 2995, at approximately 3:30 a.m.,
2200 West 5400 South, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL TROOPER DAVID BAIRETT
3.

On November 14, 1995, at approximately 3:31 a.m., while

on patrol duty, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper David Bairett ("Trooper
Bairett") was stopped at the traffic control signal at 5400 South
Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4.

Trooper Bairettfs marked patrol vehicle then faced west.
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Trooper

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

PAGE SIX

Bairett

noticed

a

red

Ford

pickup

truck

("pickup") approach him from the rear at a high rate of speed.
6.

The pickup stopped at the red light in the lane next to

Trooper Bairett,
7.

Trooper Bairett looked at the driver of the pickup from

a distance of approximately eight to ten feet.
8.

The lighting was sufficient for Trooper Bairett to see

the features of the driver of the pickup.
9.

When the light turned green, the pickup proceeded west

across Redwood Road at approximately 25 miles per hour.
10.

The speed limit on 5400 South at that location is 45

miles per hour.
11.

Trooper Bairett slowed his patrol vehicle so that the

driver of the pickup was forced to proceed ahead of Trooper
Bairett.
12.

Trooper Bairett was able to observe that the registration

on the pickup's rear license plate had expired.
13.

Trooper Bairett read the license plate number to Dispatch

and was subsequently informed that the plate was not registered to
the pickup.
14.

Trooper Bairett decided to stop the pickup.
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15.

The pickup turned south from 5400 South onto 2200 West.

16.

At that point 2200 West is a dead-end street, ending in

a cul-de-sac.
17.

The speed limit on 2200 West where the pickup turned

southbound is 25 miles per hour.
18.

Following the pickup, Trooper Bairett also turned his

patrol vehicle southbound onto 2200 West.
19.

Trooper Bairett activated the overhead lights on his

patrol vehicle.
20.

The pickup accelerated and began to pull away from

Trooper Bairett.
21.

The pickup entered the cul-de-sac.

22.

While the pickup was in the cul-de-sac, Trooper Bairett

attempted to block its path with his patrol vehicle; however, the
pickup maneuvered between the patrol vehicle and some mail boxes
and, by driving over the front lawns of two residences, was able to
exit the cul-de-sac, turn north and get back onto 2200 West.
23.

By the time Trooper Bairett was able to turn his patrol

car around to follow the pickup, the pickup was approximately 200
yards ahead of Trooper Bairett, still heading northbound on 2200
West.
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Trooper Bairett proceeded northbound after the pickup;

however, even at a speed of approximately 75 miles per hour,
Trooper Bairett was unable to narrow substantially the distance
between him and the pickup.
25.

Trooper Bairett observed that the traffic control signal

ahead of the pickup at the intersection of 5400 South and 2200 West
was red.
26.

Based upon his experience that most vehicles slow at red

lights and because he observed the pickup's brake lights come on
briefly, Trooper Bairett thought the pickup would stop at the red
light.
27.

However, the pickup did not stop; instead, it entered the

intersection when the light facing it was red.
28.

As the pickup entered the intersection, Trooper Bairett

was located approximately 150 yards to the south on 2200 West.
29.

As the pickup entered the intersection northbound, a

Saturn passenger vehicle entered the intersection westbound at a
speed of approximately 40 miles per hour.
30.

The pickup and Saturn collided near the middle of the

intersection.
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The force of the impact caused the pickup to roll; it

came to rest upside down on its top.
32.

The Saturn crashed into a greenhouse before it came to

33.

Trooper Bairett proceeded directly to the collision scene

rest.

and radioed for assistance from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office.
34.

Trooper Bairett observed considerable debris from the

collision.
35.

Trooper Bairett observed unopened beer cans in the

intersection.
36.

Trooper Bairett observed a male exit the rear window of

the pickup.
37.

Trooper Bairett took that male into custody, handcuffed

him and placed him in front of the patrol vehicle.
38.

Trooper Bairett also observed that the individual he had

earlier seen driving the vehicle was partially pinned on the
passenger side of the upside-down pickup.
39.

Trooper Bairett identified the man he had seen driving

the pickup at 5400 South Redwood Road as the defendant, Daniel K.
Riggs.
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Trooper Bairett noticed the defendant had a head injury

which was bleeding, but not profusely.
41.

To Trooper Bairett, the defendant appeared to be in

shock.
42.

The

defendant mumbled,

answered

questions

and made

statements.
43.
scene,

Later, while the defendant was still at the collision
it

appeared

to

Trooper

Bairett

that

the

defendant's

condition improved.
44.

Trooper Bairett detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage

coming from the defendant.
45.

Trooper Bairett acknowledged that a head injury can cause

someone to appear intoxicated and yet not be; however, because of
the defendant's appearance and the sound of his voice, Trooper
Bairett believed the defendant, notwithstanding his head injury,
was, in fact, intoxicated.
46.

Trooper Bairett told the defendant that help was on the

way and to remain still.
47.

Trooper Bairett proceeded to the greenhouse to attempt to

assess the injuries of those in the Saturn.
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Trooper Bairett also found an individual who had been

ejected from the pickup on the ground.
49.

Trooper Bairett returned to the defendant at the pickup.

50.

Trooper Bairett asked the defendant who was driving the

pickup.
51.

Trooper Bairett asked the defendant why the defendant had

run from him and why he was driving.
52.

In response,

the defendant told Trooper Bairett that he

was driving because "everybody else was too drunk to drive."
53.

Trooper Bairett had not informed the defendant of his

Miranda rights prior to questioning him.
54.

Trooper Bairett requested Dispatch to send additional

help "for blood draw purposes as well as traffic control at the
scene."
55.

Trooper Bairett has been with the Utah Highway Patrol

just over three years.
56.

Trooper Bairett was trained at POST to recognize drunk

drivers.
57.

Prior to November 14, 1995, Trooper Bairett had made

approximately 80-85 DUI arrests.
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Trooper Bairett believed there was the potential for some

of those involved

in the collision to die because

of their

injuries.
59.

Trooper Bairett determined to have blood drawn from the

defendant.
60.

Trooper Bairett did not leave the collision scene because

of his duties.
61.
Sheriff's

Trooper Bairett spoke to "one or more" Salt Lake County
deputies

("deputies") after

they

responded

to the

collision scene.
62.
L. Craig

In particular, Trooper Bairett spoke with Sergeant Delwin
("Sergeant Craig") and to Deputy Lawrence Stratford

("Deputy Stratford").
63.

Trooper Bairett described to Deputy Stratford what he had

observed and his concerns.
64.

Trooper Bairett did not arrest the defendant at the

collision scene.
SERGEANT DELWIN L. CRAIG
65.

On November

14, 1995, at approximately

3:40 a.m.,

Sergeant Craig responded to the collision scene.
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Sergeant Craig observed the two vehicles involved in the

collision and the debris strewn about.
67.

The debris Sergeant Craig observed included beer cans,

candy bars, cigarettes, a rifle and vehicle parts.
68.

Sergeant Craig observed a body lying in a grassy area, a

body lying inside the truck, two occupants in the Saturn and "two
others outside the vehicles sitting."
69.

Sergeant Craig treated the area of the collision as a

crime scene and placed deputies at specific locations.
70.

Sergeant Craig spoke very briefly with Trooper Bairett,

at which time Trooper Bairett told Sergeant Craig that he had tried
to stop the pickup and that the pickup

"took off on him" and then

collided with the Saturn in the intersection.
71.

Trooper Bairett pointed out the defendant to Sergeant

Craig and stated that the defendant was the driver of the pickup.
72.

Sergeant Craig spoke to the defendant.

73.

Sergeant Craig was told at the scene by EMT's that the

defendant's head injury was worse than it looked.
74.

Sergeant Craig acknowledged that a head injury could

cause some disorientation.
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Sergeant Craig got "very close" to the defendant and

observed that the defendant was "shaken up" and had bloodshot eyes.
76.

When he was "probably within one foot of the defendant,"

Sergeant Craig noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming
from the defendant.
77.

Sergeant Craig asked Deputy Lonnie Wilson to remain with

the defendant.
78.

Sergeant Craig called East Patrol and requested the

assistance of a deputy to witness the defendant's blood draw.
79.
evidence

Sergeant Craig believed he had enough information and
to

justify

the

defendant's

blood

being

drawn.

Specifically, the information he had included that he
a.

saw the pickup on its roof;

b.

observed the Saturn lodged in the side of the
greenhouse;

c.

observed the beer cans strewn about;

d.

knew that Trooper Bairett had tried to stop the
pickup and that the pickup "took off on [Trooper
Bairett]" and

then collided with the Saturn in the

intersection;

0 0047 3

STATE V. RIGGS

e.

PAGE FIFTEEN

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

knew from Trooper Bairett that the defendant was
the

driver of the pickup;

f.

got "very close" to the defendant;

g.

noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming
from the defendant;

h.

observed that the defendant was "shaken up" and had
bloodshot eyes;

I.

spoke to the defendant;

j.

observed the defendant's head wound but believed,
nevertheless, that the defendant was intoxicated;

k.

was aware that there were going to be some
fatalities from the collision.

80.

As of November 14, 1995, Sergeant Craig had been an

officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office for seven years.
81.

Prior to November 14, 1995, Sergeant Craig had been

trained to recognize intoxicated drivers.
82.

As of November 14, 1995, Sergeant Craig had been involved

in approximately 70 DUI arrests.
83.

In response to Sergeant Craig's request for a deputy to

witness the blood draw on defendant, Deputy Craig Don Roberts
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("Deputy Roberts''), arrived at the collision scene to carry out
that responsibility.
DEPUTY CRAIG DON ROBERTS
84.

When Deputy Roberts arrived, the defendant was secured

onto a stretcher by straps and was waiting to be loaded into an
ambulance.
85.

Deputy Roberts was present at the collision scene very

briefly ("a minute or two," "just about a minute").
86.

While he was at the scene, Deputy Roberts observed

several patrol vehicles, ambulances and paramedics.
87.

Deputy Roberts observed the pickup and Saturn which had

been involved in the collision.
88.

Deputy Roberts observed the debris in the immediate area.

89.

The debris included beer cans and vehicle parts.

90.

Deputy Roberts spoke with an officer on the scene, Deputy

Jason Jones, who explained to Deputy Roberts that the driver of the
pickup had "blown the intersection and hit the red car sending it
into the building.

And that the person [Roberts] was supposed to

go watch, this Daniel Riggs, was the one that was driving the
truck."
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Sergeant Craig directed Deputy Roberts to go to Pioneer

Valley Hospital and "witness" the blood draw on the defendant.
92.

Deputy

Roberts

then

followed

the

ambulance

to

the

hospital.
93.

Prior to November 14, 1995, Deputy Roberts had worked in

law enforcement for the Midvale City Police Department for almost
four years.
94.

Deputy

Roberts

has

been

with

the

Salt

Lake

County

Sheriff's office for just over a year.
95.

At the time of the collision, Deputy Roberts had training

in the apprehension of intoxicated drivers through POST, understood
how to use the intoxalyzer and was experienced in performing field
sobriety tests.
96.

Deputy Roberts has made " [p]robably a couple hundred [DUI

arrests] in the last five years."
DEPUTY LAWRENCE
97.
November

Deputy
14,

Stratford

1995,

shortly

arrived
after

STRATFORD
at
the

the

scene

on

carrying

the

collision

ambulance

defendant left for the hospital.
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Detective Stratford was responsible

for heading the

collision investigation team and "took charge" of the investigation
when he arrived at the scene.
99.

Deputy Stratford was briefed at the scene by Trooper

Bairett, Sergeant Craig and other law enforcement officers.
100. Trooper Bairett described his observations and concerns
to Deputy Stratford.
101. Based on his briefing with Trooper Bairett, Sergeant
Craig and other law enforcement officers, Deputy Stratford was
aware of considerable evidence regarding the likely cause of the
collision and the possible use of alcoholic beverages by the
defendant.
102. Deputy Stratford observed beer cans in the collision
debris.
103. Deputy Stratford observed open beer cans within the cab
of the pickup.
104. Although not "100 percent" certain, after his briefing
with the law enforcement officers, Deputy Stratford had a "strong
idea" that the defendant was the driver of the pickup.
105. According to Sergeant Craig, Deputy Stratford ordered the
blood draw on the defendant.
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Sergeant

Craig

to

send

deputies to witness blood draws on the defendant, Michael Lambrou,
Lonnie James, and Kevin Smithson.
107. Michael Lambrou and Lonnie James had been in the Saturn;
Kevin Smithson had been in the pickup.
108. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford was a law
enforcement officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office.
109. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford had worked for
the Salt Lake County Sheriff for approximately 12 years.
110. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford was assigned to
the Traffic Division as an investigator.
THE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD DRAW
111. Subsequent to the arrival of Deputy Roberts at the
hospital, he and the state's phlebotomist, Bryan Davis

("Mr.

Davis") , together went into the emergency room where the defendant
lay.
112. When

Deputy

Roberts

and

Bryan

Davis

entered

the

defendant's emergency room, the straps which had secured the
defendant to the stretcher had been removed and the defendant had
been moved from the stretcher to a hospital bed.
113. The defendant was awake and appeared to be coherent.
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114. Deputy Roberts told the defendant they "were there to do
a blood draw."
115. Deputy Roberts did not tell the defendant the blood was
for police purposes.
116. In response to Deputy Roberts' statement, the defendant
voiced no objection.
117. The defendant did not indicate that Deputy Roberts and
Mr. Davis could proceed with the blood draw.
118. No search warrant authorizing the blood draw was obtained
prior to the drawing of the defendant's blood.
119. Deputy Roberts observed that the defendant had a head
wound and that there was blood on his head.
120. From a distance of approximately one foot, Deputy Roberts
smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the defendant's
breath; however, he did not notice any slurring of speech by the
defendant.
121. Throughout the time Deputy Roberts observed the defendant
at the hospital, the defendant was "pretty well doing everything
that the nurses asked him to do."
122. As time passed between 4:46

a.m.

and

6:30

a.m. on

November 14, 1995, to Deputy Roberts "[it] seemed that [the
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defendant] got better and was more alert and was more able to move
around and do the things that [the nurses] asked him to do."
123. Deputy Roberts was aware that fatalities were involved in
the collision.
124. Deputy Roberts was aware that blood draws were also being
performed on other individuals involved in the collision.
125. Deputy Roberts did not arrest the defendant at Pioneer
Valley Hospital.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND STORAGE OF THE STATE-ANALYZED BLOOD
126. Bryan Davis is a phlebotomist on contract with law
enforcement agencies throughout Salt Lake County to draw blood from
suspects at the request of law enforcement officers.
127. Mr. Davis is familiar with the provisions of Section 416-44 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended.
128. On November

14, 1995, Mr

Davis

was

qualified

and

authorized by the Utah State Health Department pursuant to Utah law
to perform blood draws in behalf of the State on DUI suspects and
he had been so qualified and authorized for approximately 11 years.
129. During the last approximately 12 years, Mr. Davis has
performed over 9,000 evidentiary draws.
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130. Mr. Davis testified that he consistently follows standard
procedures in the performance, handling and storage of evidentiary
blood draws.
131. In this case, Mr. Davis followed his standard, consistent
procedures

in the performance, handling

and

storage

of

the

defendant's blood draw evidence.
132. The procedures followed by Mr. Davis in this and his
other evidentiary blood draws are that he
a.

obtains the blood;

b.

encloses the blood in glass vacutainer tubes;

c.

individually marks the tubes with the defendant's
name, Mr. Davis' initials, the date of the blood
draw and the time of the blood draw;

d.

places the tubes into an envelope which contains
virtually the same information, along with some
information regarding the police agency's case and
deputies or officers involved in the accident;

e.

seals the envelope by a gum seal and tapes over the
seal;

f.

has the officer witnessing the seal sign on the
back of the envelope; and
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maintains the envelope containing the tubes in his
possession or under secure conditions until he can
deliver it to the State forensic toxicologist.

133. The

tubes

into

which

the

blood

is

drawn

contain

preservative, or anticoagulant, agents: one tube contains sodium
fluoride and the second contains potassium oxalate.
134. On the morning on November 14, 1995, Mr. Davis went to
Pioneer Valley Hospital to draw the defendant's blood.
135. Mr. Davis did, in fact, draw the defendant's blood.
13 6. Mr. Davis prepared the defendant's arm for the blood draw
by cleansing the area with a soap and water solution.
137. Mr.

Davis

stated

it

was

"probable"

he

moved

the

defendant's arm out to draw the blood and then drew the blood.
138. It is undisputed that Mr. Davis performed the blood draw
in a reasonable and safe manner.
139. It took Mr. Davis approximately three minutes to complete
the blood draw.
140. As the blood was being drawn, the defendant neither
withdrew his arm nor voiced an objection to the procedure.
141. At the same time Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood for
state-analysis, either Mr. Davis or a nurse from Pioneer Hospital
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drew three additional tubes of the defendant's blood for his
medical treatment.
142. Thus, a combined total of five tubes of blood were drawn
from the defendant: two for state-analysis and three for hospitalanalysis.
143. The tubes of blood drawn for the State were marked with
the defendant's name, the date and time and Mr. Davis1 initials.
144. Mr. Davis then sealed the tubes of blood in an envelope
and taped over the seal.
145. Deputy Roberts signed the back of the envelope over the
taped seal.
14 6. After leaving the hospital, Mr. Davis placed the envelope
containing the vials of blood drawn from the defendant in a
container in his locked motor vehicle.
147. The container into which Mr. Davis placed the envelope is
a non-refrigerated cooler which Mr. Davis had positioned in his
vehicle for the purpose of holding blood draw evidence.
148. The cooler is not locked.
149. Mr. Davis then drove to LDS Hospital, Cottonwood Hospital
and the University of Utah Medical Center to perform similar blood
draws.
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150. Mr. Davis locked his vehicle when he exited.
151. The

container

in

the vehicle

did

not

need

to be

refrigerated because the tubes into which the blood had been drawn
contained preservatives which temporarily protect the blood against
deterioration.
152. According to Mr. Davis, blood protected by preservatives
is commonly sent by mail throughout the country in unrefrigerated
packages.
153. Dennis Crouch, the defendant's forensic toxicologist
expert witness

("Mr.

Crouch"), agreed that blood protected by

preservatives is often sent by mail throughout the country in
unrefrigerated packages.
154. The fact the defendant's blood was temporarily placed in
the unrefrigerated cooler did not affect the accuracy of the blood
alcohol content results.
155. When he had performed all of the blood draws that
morning, Mr. Davis took the envelope containing the tubes of
defendant's blood, together with similar envelopes containing blood
samples from the other blood draws performed that morning to his
home where he placed them in a specifically-designated bottom
drawer in his refrigerator.
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156. Mr. Davis1 refrigerator and the drawer in which Mr. Davis
stores the blood sample envelopes are not locked.
157. Mr.

Davis' wife

and

children

have

access

to

the

refrigerator drawer; however, Mr. Davis has instructed all of his
family members never to open the drawer containing the envelopes.
158. No food is kept in the designated drawer.
159. Subsequently, Mr. Davis transferred the envelope holding
the defendant's blood samples to the State Laboratory where Mr.
Beck took custody of the blood samples.
160. Mr. Davis testified, based on his various inspections of
the envelope which held the defendant's blood sample, that at no
time during which he had custody of the defendant's blood samples
was there any indication whatsoever that the seal of the envelope
had been tampered with or come off, that either of the tubes had
broken or leaked, that the identifying labels on the packages had
shifted or come off, and that when he transferred the envelope to
Mr. Beck the envelope was in the exact same condition it was when
the envelope was sealed at Pioneer Valley Hospital.
161. No evidence was presented to suggest that while the blood
was in the custody of Mr. Davis that the envelope containing the
sealed tubes of the defendant's blood had been tampered with.
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162. No evidence was presented to suggest any bad faith on the
part of the State in Mr. Davis' handling of the blood sample taken
from the defendant.
TESTING OF THE STATE-ANALYZED BLOOD
163. Mr. Beck personally received from Mr. Davis the sealed
envelope containing the two tubes of defendant's blood on November
16, 1995, at 3 p.m.
164. Mr. Beck is employed by the Utah State Division of
Laboratories as a toxicologist.
165. Mr. Beck has a Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry,
a Bachelor of Science degree in pharmacy and approximately 23 years
of on-the-job experience.
166. Mr.

Beck

is

a member

of

the

Society

of

Forensic

Toxicologists and a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensics
Toxicology.
167. The parties stipulated that Mr. Beck is an expert for the
purposes of the suppression hearing.
168. Upon receipt of the defendant's blood samples, Mr. Beck
prepared the samples for testing and then placed the samples in the
refrigerator in the evidence room of the State Laboratory.
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169. The evidence room is not open to the public and is locked
unless staff are present in the room.
170. Later in the afternoon that day at 4:55 p.m., Mr. Beck
tested the defendant's blood samples for the presence of ethanol,
which is normal drinking alcohol.
171. Mr.

Beck

used

a

testing

device

known

as

a

gas

chromatograph ("GC") to analyze the defendant's blood for ethanol.
172. The

GC equipment used by Mr. Beck

to

analyze the

defendant's blood is considered to be the standard machine used by
toxicologists to determine the presence of ethanol in blood.
173. Quality controls are used in the GC testing process to
ensure that the equipment is working properly.
174. Quality controls are used before, during and following
the testing of blood samples.
175. The quality controls used before, during and after the GC
testing of the defendant's blood indicated that the GC equipment
was functioning within acceptable tolerances.
17 6. The

GC

equipment

at

the

State

Laboratory

has

50

carousels, which enables the analysis of multiple blood samples on
one run.
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177. The results of the GC analysis of each blood sample
tested correspond to each numbered carousel in which a blood sample
is placed.
178. Two tests were performed on each of defendant's blood
samples.
179. The results of the analysis of the defendant's blood
indicated 0.13 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of

blood.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND TESTING OF THE HOSPITAL-ANALYZED BLOOD
180. On November 14, 1995, Cindy Sadler ("Nurse Sadler") was
employed as a registered nurse by Pioneer Valley Hospital and was
involved in the blood draw of the defendant.
181. As of November 14, 1995, Nurse Sadler had an Associate
Degree from Weber State College.
182. Nurse

Sadler has worked as a registered

nurse for

eighteen years.
183. Nurse Sadler is not aware of a specific policy at Pioneer
Valley Hospital

regarding

the analysis of alcohol

in people

involved in accidents; however, Nurse Sadler is aware that the
hospital does ask for analysis of alcohol in the blood of people
involved in accidents.
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184, After Mr. Davis drew two tubes of blood for the State,
either he or Nurse Sadler drew three more tubes for use by the
hospital.
185. Nurse Sadler received the hospital's three tubes of
defendant's blood.
18 6. Nurse

Sadler

then

copied

the defendant's

name

and

identifying information from his hospital armband onto labels
which, in turn, she placed on each of the three blood tubes.
187. Nurse Sadler also placed her initials, "CS," on each of
the three tubes.
188. Nurse Sadler then sent the three tubes to the Pioneer
Valley Hospital Laboratory for analysis.
189. On November 14, 1995, Stanley R. Hardy ("Mr. Hardy") was
employed as a medical technician in the Pioneer Valley Hospital
Laboratory.
190. Mr. Hardy's education, training and experience qualify
him to perform the analysis of blood to determine the presence of
ethyl alcohol.
191. Mr. Hardy received the three tubes of defendant's blood
and tested it on a Roche Mira machine.
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192. The defendant does not challenge the chain of custody or
the accuracy of the blood testing procedure of the defendant's
hospital-analyzed blood.
193. Mr. Hardy knew the two tubes contained the defendant's
blood because the label on each tube indicating the defendant's
name and hospital armband information matched the information on
the defendant's order slip because the order slip also contained
the defendant's name and identifying hospital armband information.
194. The order slip tells him the test(s) he is to perform on
the blood samples.
195. Mr. Hardy also identified the initials "CS" that had been
placed on the tubes by Nurse Sadler and his own initials, "SH, "
that indicate who performed the test.
196. Mr. Hardy ran the blood test on the defendant's blood.
197. When the defendant's blood was tested, the machine was
working properly and operating "within control."
198. After running the test on the samples, Mr. Hardy received
the test results and confirmed that the test results were from the
blood drawn from the defendant.
199. The results of the analysis of the defendant's blood
indicated 141.7 milligrams of ethanol per deciliter of blood.

f\

< f) A

0h v

•Pi f.

idd

STATE V. RIGGS

PAGE THIRTY-TWO

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

200. Point 7 (.7) milligrams per deciliter is the equivalent
of 0.1417 grams per 100 milliliters.
201. In opposition to the chain of custody, handling and
storage procedures concerning the state-analyzed blood to which Mr.
David and Mr. Beck testified, the defendant called as his expert
witness, Dennis Crouch, a forensic toxicologist at the Center for
Human Toxicology and Research.
202. Mr. Crouch, who has impressive credentials as a forensic
toxicologist, strongly criticized procedures like those followed by
Mr. Davis and Mr. Beck pertaining to the defendant's blood, but
which were put to him hypothetically by defense counsel.
203. Among

other

things, Mr. Crouch

testified

regarding

minimum guidelines jointly recommended by the Society of Forensic
Toxicologists and the Toxicology Section of the American Academy of
Forensic

Sciences

for

laboratories

engaged

in

medical/legal

testing.
204. Also according to Mr. Crouch, based on hypothetical
questions put to him by defense counsel which were designed to
track the procedures followed by Mr. Davis and Mr. Beck, minimum
guidelines concerning chain of custody, security, documentation
were not met, security procedures as posed to him were deficient,
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distinctions between temporary and permanent storage areas of blood
samples should have been made, blood samples should not have been
tested in the same area in which they were stored and blood samples
must be in the tester's line of sight or else be documented to be
stored in a freezer or refrigerated container under lock.
205. However, Mr. Crouch did not have any evidence to suggest
that the tubes containing the defendant's blood had been tampered
with in any way prior to be tested on the GC equipment.
206. Mr. Crouch also agreed that his own lab receives blood
mailed by U.S. mail delivery from other places in Utah that has
been mailed in unrefrigerated containers.
207. Finally, Mr. Crouch did not address
notwithstanding
testing

of

the

the

the differences in the handling,
state-analyzed

blood

(which

Mr.

fact that

storage and
Crouch

did

criticize) and the hospital-analyzed blood procedures in this case
(which the defendant did not challenge) , the state-analyzed results
concluded that the defendant's blood alcohol level on November 14,
1995, was 0.13 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of

blood, and

that the hospital-analyzed results found that the defendant's blood
alcohol level on November 14, 1995, was .1417 grams of ethanol per
100 milliliters of blood.

If anything, the hospital-analyzed blood
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test results themselves underscore the accuracy of the stateanalyzed blood test results and thereby affirm the reliability of
the

State's handling,

storage and testing procedures

of the

defendant's blood samples.
STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WHILE
HOSPITALIZED AT THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
208. Following some initial treatment and the blood draw on
November 14, 1995, the defendant was transferred from Pioneer
Valley Hospital to the University Medical Center ("UUMC").
209. Fairly soon after the defendant's admission to the UUMC
on November 14, 1995, a UUMC representative contacted Deputy
Stratford to tell him that the hospital had received threats
against the defendant's life and that the hospital was concerned
the defendant's family might remove him from the hospital against
the hospital's wishes.
210. In response, the defendant was provided protection by
security guards, including deputies from the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office, until he was released from the UUMC.
211. The guards were stationed in the defendant's room also to
ensure that the defendant did not leave the hospital.
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DEPUTY BRAD HUNTER
212. From approximately 3:00 p.m. until 5:30 p.m., November
14, 1995, Deputy Brad Hunter ("Deputy Hunter7') was assigned to
guard the defendant in his room at the UUMC.
213. Deputy Hunter did not go to the UUMC to interrogate the
defendant.
214. Deputy Hunter neither interrogated the defendant nor
asked him any specific questions.
215. Deputy Hunter did not advise the defendant of his rights
per Miranda while he was stationed in the defendant's room.
216. When

Deputy

Hunter,

in

uniform,

walked

into

the

defendant's room, the defendant asked him why he was there.
217. Deputy Hunter told the defendant he was there to keep the
defendant at the hospital because the defendant had threatened to
leave.
218. According to Deputy Hunter, the defendant appeared to be
"banged up" and "mentally okay but a little tired."
219. While Deputy Hunter was present the defendant received no
medical attention other than visits "every so often" by a nurse to
"give blood checks."
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defendant

had

a

"general

conversation" for approximately one hour of the two and a half
hours he was in the defendant's room.
221. Deputy Hunter recalled three statements made by the
defendant which he subsequently included in his report.
222. Except as discussed in Findings of Fact Nos. 223 and 226,
there was no discussion concerning the collision or the defendant's
possible involvement in the collision.
223. The first remark spontaneously made by the defendant was
that his (the defendant's) sister had seen him (the defendant) on
the 12 o'clock news.
224. The remark was not made in answer to any question.
225. Deputy Hunter responded to the remark by telling the
defendant he (Deputy Hunter) "didn't see it" and "didn't know much
about what happened."
226. Subsequently, after Deputy Stratford arrived, according
to Deputy Hunter, at one point the defendant also spontaneously
stated that he (the defendant) and some friends had been "driving
a stolen '94...Ford Ranger extended cab," that he had "passed a cop
car.

And when he saw the cop car somebody told him to go, so he

sped up and got approximately 75 miles an hour and went through the
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red light. And that's when the accident happened."

The defendant

also said that if the accident had not happened, "he probably would
have lost the cop."
227. Deputy Hunter neither coerced nor tricked the defendant
into making these statements.
228. Before Deputy Hunter left, he and Deputy Stratford were
together in the defendant's room for approximately five minutes.
229. Deputy

Hunter

knew

Deputy

Stratford

came

to

the

defendant's room to "complete the investigation."
230. Deputy Hunter is and has been a deputy in the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's office for approximately three and a half years.
231. Deputy Hunter was a credible witness.
DEPUTY LAWRENCE STRATFORD
232. Shortly before 6:00 p.m. on November 14, 1995, Deputy
Stratford arrived at the defendant's room at the UUMC.
233. Deputy Stratford went to the UUMC initially "to find out
the problem with the threats" and then decided "that while [he] was
there [he] would try and obtain [the defendant's] side of the story
to find out [the defendant's] version of what happened."
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234. Deputy Stratford did not advise the defendant of his
rights per Miranda while he was present in the defendant's hospital
room.
235. Deputy Hunter was present in the defendant's room when
Deputy Stratford arrived.
236. Deputy Stratford was in uniform when he came to the
defendant's room.
237. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the defendant was talking
to Deputy Hunter.
238. Deputy Stratford asked the defendant "if he remembered
the accident so that

[Deputy Stratford] could

find out

[the

defendant's] side of the story."
239. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the room's television was
on.

After Deputy Stratford asked the defendant if he remembered

the accident, a television news story came on about the accident.
240. Distracted by the news story, Deputies Stratford and
Hunter turned to listen to it.
241. At

that

time,

according

to

Deputy

Stratford,

the

defendant spontaneously stated that "he knew the car was stolen
before the officer turned his lights on and they decided to run
from him;" "the gun was loaded and that Kevin bought it;" and that
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"he was just taking them home and knew nothing about the burglary
earlier."
242. The deputies themselves had turned to watch the news
report and were not talking to the defendant when he made these
statements.
243. Deputy

Stratford

neither

coerced

nor

tricked

the

defendant to make any statements.
244. Although Deputy Stratford had asked a question about
whether the defendant could remember the accident so that Deputy
Stratford could fill out his version of events, the statement was
not made in response to Deputy Stratford's question.
245. Indeed, the question was not actually responsive to the
question asked.
24 6. Some of Deputy Stratford's testimony conflicted with some
of his other testimony; however, he was, nevertheless, a credible
witness.
DEPUTY DIRK ROESLER
247. On November

16, 1995, Deputy Dirk Roesler

("Deputy

Roesler") went to the UUMC to guard the defendant.
248. On November 16, the defendant was considered by law
enforcement to be "in custody."
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249. Deputy Roesler did not go to the UUMC to interrogate the
defendant.
250. Deputy Roesler did not interrogate the defendant while he
(Deputy Roesler) was guarding the defendant.
251. Deputy Roesler did not advise the defendant of his
rights per Miranda while he was in the defendant's hospital room.
252. Deputy Roesler indicated that at times the defendant
appeared to be heavily medicated and groggy.
253. Nevertheless, Deputy Roesler and the defendant were able
to converse casually.
254. They did not discuss the accident nor the defendant's
part therein except as follows in Findings 255, 256 and 257.
255. At one point, the defendant spontaneously expressed to
Deputy Roesler that he feared for his (defendant's) safety and
asked if there was anything Deputy Roesler could do to arrange for
confinement outside of the county.
256. In response, Deputy Roesler advised the defendant to
consult

with

his

attorney

concerning

the

conditions

of his

confinement.
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257. Notwithstanding Deputy Roesler's advice, the defendant
continued

to

discuss

the

site of his

confinement

and

then

volunteered the statement, "I did it, I'm guilty as hell."
258. Deputy Roesler neither coerced nor tricked the defendant
to make any statement.
259. Deputy Roesler has been in law enforcement with the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's office since October 1991.
260. Deputy Roesler was a credible witness.
THE DEFENDANT'S MEDICAL CONDITION AND WHETHER ANY
STATEMENTS BY HIM WERE MADE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY
261. While at the scene of the collision, the defendant was
partially pinned under the truck and was not free to leave.
262. Trooper Bairett had considerable probable cause evidence
against the defendant to believe the defendant had been driving
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident.
2 63. Trooper Bairett had considerable evidence to believe that
the defendant caused the accident and that the accident was likely
to cause at least one death.
2 64. To Trooper Bairett the defendant appeared to be in shock.
264. In view of all of the circumstances, Trooper Bairett
asked the defendant questions which were likely to elicit
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admissions from the defendant without first informing him of his
Miranda rights.
2 65. While

at

the UUMC, the defendant

received

medical

treatment for his injuries resulting from the collision.
266. At

times

during

his hospitalization,

appeared to be tired, groggy and medicated,

the

defendant

it appears that

throughout the day of November 14, his state of alertness improved
and he was "pretty well" able to do what the nurses asked him to
do.
267. At

the

time

the

defendant

allegedly

made

his

incriminating statements to the officers, his medical condition
did not appear to render him unable to make the statements to the
officers knowingly and voluntarily.
268. To the contrary, according to the officers, at each time
the defendant volunteered one of these statements, the defendant
had been engaged in casual conversations.
269. Deputies Hunter, Stratford or Roesler neither tricked nor
coerced the defendant into making incriminating statements.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes
the following as a matter of law:
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Trooper Bairettfs questions to the defendant at the scene

1.

of the collision at which time the defendant was partially pinned
under the truck and in shock and which were made in the absence of
a

Miranda

warning

went

beyond

the

investigatory

stage

and,

therefor, are suppressed.
2.

The defendant should have been advised of his rights per

Miranda when Trooper Bairett proceeded to interrogate the defendant
about his driving the pickup and why he had run from Trooper
Bairett.
3.

The

defendant,

despite

his

actions

and

lack

of

objections, did not expressly consent to the blood draw by Mr.
Davis.
4.

Because no search warrant authorizing the blood draw had

been obtained prior to the blood draw and because the defendant was
not under arrest, three factors must be satisfied for the blood
draw to pass constitutional muster: first, the draw itself must be
performed in a reasonable and safe manner.
factor,

it

is undisputed

that

With regard to this

the draw was performed

in a

reasonable and safe fashion.
Second, probable cause must be exist for the draw and known to
the officer (s) who directs that a blood draw be conducted.
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Third, exigent circumstances must be present to conduct the
search without a search warrant.
5.

Trooper Bairett, Sergeant Craig and Deputy Stratford

each had probable cause to believe the defendant had operated the
pickup while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage and,
thus, could direct a blood draw.
7.

Trooper Bairett, having probable cause to believe the

defendant had operated the pickup while under the influence of
alcohol, did radio Dispatch and request help, including someone to
help with the defendant's blood draw.
8.

Deputy

Roberts,

the

law

enforcement

official

who

witnessed the blood draw, also had independent probable cause to
order the procedure.
9.

To prevent the dissipation of evidence of ethanol in an

individual's system is a recognized exigent circumstance.
10.

The chain of custody of the blood drawn by Mr. Davis and

maintained by the State of Utah was not defective; the blood tubes
had not, prior to being tested, been tampered with in any way and
the State did not exhibit any bad faith in the handling, storage or
testing of the blood.

*/1 u o v:]

STATE V. RIGGS

11.

PAGE FORTY-FIVE

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

The chain of custody of the state-analyzed blood evidence

was sufficient.
12.

The handling, storage and testing procedures for the

state-analyzed blood did not affect the accuracy of the blood
samples.
13.

The testing procedures for the defendant's state-analyzed

blood were appropriate, accurate and reliable.

The testing

equipment is standard for blood alcohol testing and the machine was
calibrated and working properly before, during and after the test.
14.

The State established an appropriate chain of custody of

the hospital-analyzed blood, and the defendant does not contest
this chain of custody.
15.

It is unclear whether it was Mr. Davis or Nurse Sadler

who drew the three additional tubes of the defendant's blood.
However, under the totality of the circumstances, the reason these
three additional tubes of blood were drawn related solely to the
defendant's medical treatment and, therefor, does not constitute an
unconstitutional search of the defendant.
16.
to

the

Rule 506(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is an exception
physician-patient

privilege

and

provides

that

no

physician-patient privilege exists as to information obtained by
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examination of the patient relevant to an issue of the physical
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition
is an element of any claim in any proceedings in which any party
relies upon the condition as an element of the claim.

In the

instant case, the State of Utah relies on the defendant's blood
alcohol content as an element of its claims that he committed three
counts of Criminal Homicide, Automobile Homicide.

Because the

blood draw itself was a constitutional search, the results of the
hospital-analyzed blood testing are otherwise admissible under Rule
506(d).
17.

The defendant was in custody at all times while he was at

the UUMC.
18.

Although the defendant could have been arrested prior to

7:30 p.m., November 16, 1995, the investigation was ongoing prior
to that time.
19.

The law enforcement officers knew the defendant was to

remain in the hospital and that he was not going to leave the
hospital.

They were not obligated to arrest the defendant prior to

his actual arrest.
20.

None of the conversations between the defendant and

Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler constituted interrogations
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to elicit

incriminating statements from the defendant.
21.

All of the incriminating statements made by the defendant

to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler were spontaneous and
voluntary.
22.

At

the

times

the defendant made

his

incriminating

statements to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler, he made the
statements knowingly and voluntarily; his medical condition did not
render him incapable of making those statements knowingly and
voluntarily.
DATED this 28th day of June, 1996.

Qu-^n

ANNE M. STIRBA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, to the
following, this ^ ^ d a y of June, 1996:

Kenneth R. Updegrove
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Lisa J. Remal
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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